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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.
14535

-vsINTERNATIONAL AMUSEMENTS, dba
ADULT BOOK AND CINEMA STORE,
STUART LEE, DAVID ANDREW PAULY,
HERSEL RICHARDSON, JR., and
KENNETH BLAIR CLEVELAND,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT .OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants were found guilty by a jury and
sentenced for distributing pornographic material.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Each appellant was separately charged for distributing pornographic material in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §'76-10-1204 (Supp. 1975).

The case was

tried before a jury which entered a verdict of guilty
against each defendant.

Each defendant was subsequently

sentenced by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the convictions
and judgments rendered below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts
contained in appellants' brief with the following
additions and corrections:
1.

Although appellants did take exception to

some of the instructions given by the court, they
failed to do so with regard to Nos. 4, 5 and 6 relating
to the element of scienter:
MR. FLORENCE: The Defendants except to the
instruction which I have numbered seven, which refers
to the Defendant David Andrew Pauly and the element
that must be found before he can be convicted and
particularly except to the provision of that portion
of paragraph 1 which says that he was the corporation.
They must find that he was the manager of the
corporation and knew or should have known that such a
book was displayed for sale.
I suggest that does not conform to the law
and the standard in the later instruction with respect
to responsibility of parties and the fact that they
must solicit, request, demand, encourage, intentionally
aid another to engage in the criminal conduct with
the same kind of criminal intent.
The same exception will be taken with respect
to the instruction on International Amusements for the
same reason and the same language that the corporation's
local managing authority knew or should have known.
Not only do we object to the knew or should have known
language, but also restricting it to local managing
authority is not being consistent with the later
instruction which says that it must be a high managerial
agent.
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Instruction No. 11, in my instructions with
respect to International Amusement and their conduct
which will constitute an offense. I suggest the court
is not limited totally to a high managerial agent,
or as in my requested instruction No. 4, the board of
directors, both of which comes out of the Utah State
law and is much more liberal than is permitted by the
Utah State law.
The defendants further except to the limitation
on their requested instruction No. 6 with respect to
the affirmative defense and excepts particularly to the
court's additional language making that defense only
available if the sale was to the person in question
was intended by the sales person.
The defendants further except to the portion of
the instruction which starts, the test is not whether
it would arouse sexual desires and particularly to that
last paragraph in that instruction which says that in
determining the common conscience of the community that
they are to consider the community including young and
old men, women and children.
I suggest that is not the test in considering
community standards. I suggest by the law it is restricted
to adults, that there is a different standard entirely
when referring to children and unreasonably and improperly
misleads the jury as to what their responsibilities are
and the standards that they must adopt in considering
whether or not these materials are offensive to community
standards.
That's

all.

(Tr.171-173).
2.

Although appellants claim to have submitted

six jury instructions to the court, it is unclear from
the record whether this was ever in fact done. Appellants1
reference to Page 166 of the transcript indicates only
their intention to submit the instructions; it does not
indicate that the court received any:

-3-

THE COURT:

Are there other matters of instructions,
general instructions?

MR. FLORENCE:

No.

Only the six that I have sub-

mitted, and I would suggest to the court
that all six of them, other than perhaps
some minor changes in adjectives and
verbs are word for word from the Utah
State statute also six of them.
THE CLERK:

I haven't received a copy.

MR. FLORENCE

I will get you one.
(Tr. 165-166)

In all fairness to appellants, however, it appears that
Proposed Instruction No. 5 on page 59 of the record
(Vol. No. 1) and Proposed Instruction No. 3 on page
60 of the record (Vol. No. 1) are part of their six
instructions. Respondents received from the Weber
County Attorneyfs Office a copy of what they believed
to be the appellants' six instructions.

Respondents

submits that in none of these six instructions do the
appellants refer to the element of scienter in the

These are included as an appendix to this brief
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court's instructions Nos. 4, 5 and 6 on which they
now claim error.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS
NOS. 4, 5, 6, 8 AND 9
Appellants' argument under Point I is twopronged:

(1) that the trial court erred in its

instructions Nos. 4, 5, and 6 in that the court left
out instruction for the element of scienter; and
(2) that in its instructions Nos. 8 and 9f the court
improperly instructed on the element of scienter.

For

clarity sake, respondents will treat these two arguments
separately.
(1) The long-standing rule concerning alleged
errors in a criminal case was articulated by the Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 45 Utah 381, 146 Pac.
28 6 (1915); the court held where there is no exception
and no assignment of error, the defendants cannot
claim error on appeal.

The reason for this rule is

to require the prosecution and the defense to assist
the court so as to avoid error:

-5-

"The purpose of exceptions is to
assist the court in giving correct
instructions. This purpose is best
served by calling its attention to
what is wrong and suggesting what
is right. But the purpose of this
procedure is not to permit a party
to take an exception upon one
ground, and then if he is convicted,
use a different ground than he disclosed to the court to obtain a reversal.
Accordingly, if the defendant has not
stated a correct basis for objection
to an instruction, he cannot wait until
after he loses, and then complain
about it for the first time."
State v. Valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 432
P.2d 53, 55 (1967) .
The Utah Supreme Court has just recently reaffirmed this rule in State v. Kazda, 545 P.2d 190
(Utah 1976):
"There is an important purpose
to be served by the rule requiring
that objections be made to the
instructions. It gives an opportunity
for the court to correct, or to fill in
any inadequacy in the instructions,
so that the jury may consider the
case on a proper basis. In order to
accomplish that purpose, the rule
should be adhered to. Accordingly,
the standard rule is that when a party
fails to make a proper objection to
an erroneous instruction, or to
present to the court a proper request
to supply any claimed deficiency in
the instructions, he is thereafter
precluded from contending error."
Id. at 192, 193.
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There is an exception to this rule, however, stated
in State v. Villiard, 27 Utah 2d 204, 494 P.2d 285
(1972), an appeal from a rape conviction.

In

Villiard, the defendant claimed error as to certain
instructions although he had failed to except to
them.

The court said that if "the error is so

palpable as obviously to reflect prejudiciality
amounting to a denial of due process or justice"
failure to except to such error would not prevent
reversal.

Ici. , at 286.

In the instant case, respondent contends that
appellants did not object to, nor did they take
exception to the instructions Nos. 4, 5 and 6 as they
relate to the scienter element.

Respondent also

contends that appellants did not offer any of their
own instructions relating to this claimed error which
would have cured the alleged defect.

Included in

respondents1 statement of facts, supra, is the
transcript recitation of appellants1 objections to the
instructions, and no where in that recitation do the
appellants make such a claim of error.

Appellants

may argue, however, that their six instructions referred to on page 166 of the transcript would have
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cured the alleged defect.

Unfortunately, however,

their instructions were not preserved in the record;
and if the six instructions sent by the Weber County
Attorney's Office are those submitted by appellants,
they do not cure the claimed defect in Instructions
Nos. 4, 5 and 6.

Assuming these were appellants'

instructions, they merely repeat the same error
now claimed:
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 1: "Before you
can find the defendants or any of them
guilty you must find that they distributed
or offered to distribute, exhibited
or offered to exhibit, pornographic
material to others."
There is no reference to the scienter element in
Proposed Instruction No. 1.
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 relates to
the definition of "contemporary community
standards."
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 3 relates to
David Andrew Pauly who was referred
to in Instruction No. 8.
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 4 relates to
International Amusements, dba, Adult
Book and Cinema Store which was referred
to in Instruction No. 9.
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 5 relates to
the definition of "high managerial agent."
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 relates to
a possible affirmative defense.
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Therefore, respondents submit that appellants have
waived their claim of error by failing to take
exception and by failing to provide curative instructions.
Appellants may claim that even if they did
waive their claim, the court should preserve it under
the Villiard exception, supra.

Respondent submits

that this argument is invalid also, for three reasons:
(A)

The purpose of instructions is to give

the jury a fair understanding of the issues of fact
to be determined and the applicable law.

To this

end the instructions must be read as a whole and not
as unrelated messages.

23A C.J.S. Criminal Law

§ 1321(1) provides:
"Provided they are consistent
with one another, all the instructions
given in a case should be read together and construed as a whole, and
if, when so construed, they state the
law fully, clearly and correctly,
they are sufficient, although a
particular instruction or part thereof, standing alone, might be objectionable. "
Instructions Nos. 8 and 9 require that the jury find
those defendants "knew or should have known" that the
material was pornographic.

Instruction No. 10 states:
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"You are instructed that
every person acting with the mental
state for the conduct of this offense
who directly commits the offense,
or who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to engage in conduct
which constitutes an offense shall
be criminally liable for such
conduct*" (Emphasis added).
And last, Instruction No* 24 informs the jurors
explicitly that they are to take the instructions
as a whole:
"These instructions though
numbered separately, are to be
considered and construed as one
connected whole. Each instruction
should be read and understood in
reference to and as a part of the
entire charge and not as though
any one sentence or instruction
separately were intended to state
the whole law of the case upon
any particular point. Moreover, the
order in which the instructions are
given has no significance as to their
relative importance."
(B) Even if this court should find that the trial
court's instructions were erroneous, this would certainly
not be prejudicial error.

During the trial the

trial judge attempted to educate the jury so that they
would be familiar with the charges and be able to
listen to the evidence with a greater awareness.
During the voir dire of the jury the judge, in an

-10-

attempt to explain the principal-agent theory of
liability, explained their liability in terms of
their intent;
"In other words if A employs B
to commit a crime on behalf of C,
they would all be liable if they
all had the same criminal intent
and that is what they are charging
here. But you would not be liable
unless you intended the commission
of the crime charged." (Tr.87)
(Emphasis added)
Again, after the jurors were sworn in the trial judge
had the clerk read the information (Tr.125) which
contained the scienter element in the definition
of the offense.

(See Record Vol. 1-13, Record Vol.

2-16, and Record Vol. 3-10).
Respondents submit that the jurors in this
case were educated and sensitized to the scienter
element by the trial court and their consideration of
this element can be inferred from a reading of the
transcript and record in light of the facts and statements contained therein.

Alternatively, if this court

finds error, the education of the jury minimizes any
prejudicial effect.
(C)

Last, there was, in effect, constructive

knowledge in this case.

In other words, knowledge on

the part of the appellants was such a foregone conclusion that even if there was error in the court's
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instructions there is no possibility that "the error
is so palpable as obviously to reflect prejudiciality
amounting to a denial of due process or justice."
State v. Villiard, supra,, at 28 6.

The jurors could

easily have inferred the scienter from a hearing
of all the facts and circumstances:
1)

There was a sign on the door stating
it was for adults only, and that
there was a brousing fee of fifty
cents.

2)

(Tr.130)

The magazine rack contained magazines
showing explicit sex on the covers.
(Tr.131)

3)

Exhibit 1-P entitled "Explicit Sex"
Vol. 1, No. 1.

4)

Exhibit 2-P entitled "Hard Act".

5)

Exhibit 3-P entitled "Hard Action"
Vol. 1, No. 1.

6) .Exhibit 4-P entitled "Tongue of Lust".
7)

Mr* Pauly had the keys to the movie
projectors (Tr.149)•

Therefore, in light of the above three arguments,
the case at bar does not come under any exception to
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the rule that if the defendant fails to claim error
in an instruction he is thereby precluded from
raising it on appeal.
Appellants rely on Smith v. People, 361 U.S.
147, 4 L.Ed.2d 205, 80 S.Ct. 215 (1959) to support
their contention that the trial court's instructions
were Constitutionally defective.

In Smith, the court

struck down an ordinance which would have imposed
strict liability for selling obscene books, stating
that such an ordinance would place too heavy a burden
on a bookseller.

Appellants overlook that the court

differentiated between striking down a strict liability
obscentity law, and determining a constitutionally
adequate

mens rea.
"We need not and most definitely
do not pass today on what sort of
mental element is requisite to a
constitutionally permissible prosecution
of a bookseller for carrying an
obscene book in stock; whether honest
mistake as to whether its contents
in fact constituted obscenity need
be an excuse; whether there might
be circumstances under which the State
constitutionally might require that
a bookseller investigate further, or
might put on him the burden of explaining why he did not, and what
such circumstances might be. Doubtless
any form of criminal obscenity statute
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applicable to a bookseller will
induce some tendency to selfcensorship and have some inhibitory
effect on the dissemination of
material not obscene, but we consider
today only one which goes to the
extent of eliminating all mental
elements from the crime." IcL at
219. (Emphasis added)
(2)

The second prong of appellants1 argument

is that even though instructions Nos. 8 and 9 contained
the scienter element, the element was improperly
presented.

Appellants claim that although the in-

structions do require that these two defendants (Pauly
and International Amusements) know or have reason to
know the materials were offered for sale, "neither
instruction requires any knowledge of the character or
content of the material."

(Appellants' brief, page 13)

Since the instructions Nos. 8 and 9 vary only slightly
and that variation does not have bearing on this
issue, they will be treated together, under the wording
of No. 8.
"Before you can find DAVID ANDREW
PAULY, defendant, guilty of any of the
counts in question, you must find all
the elements of that count proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
COUNT I.
1. That on or about December 9, 1975,
there was sold and displayed for
sale Exhibit IP within Weber County,
State of Utah; and that he was the
manager of the corporation and knew or
-14-

should have known that such a book
was displayed for sale, and that
persons were employed for the purpose
of the sale." (Emphasis added)
The instruction continues, stating that that book
must be found to be illegal pornography and defining
illegal pornography.

Respondent submits that the

language of this instruction is clear, and that the
knowledge element relates to knowledge that the book
was pornographic.
The trial court did not err in its instructions
Nos. 8 and 9.

Should the court find error in instructions

Nos. 4, 5 and 6, there was no prejudicial error and
the convictions rendered below should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
THAT THE MATTER WAS TO BE JUDGED BY CONTEMPORARY
COMMUNITY STANDARDS.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(12) (Supp. 1975)
defines "contemporary community standards" as "those
current standards in the vicinage where an offense
alleged under this act has occurred, is occurring,
or will occur."

The trial judge gave almost this

identical definition in his instruction No. 14.
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"Contemporary community standards
means those current standards where an
offense alleged under this action has
occurred."
Appellants are alleging that the bounds of the
community should be defined in terms of a statewide
community standard.

The United States Supreme Court

in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 41 L.Ed.2d 642,
94 S.Ct. 2750 (1974), expressly dealt with this
issue.

In Jenkins, the court held that there is no

constitutional requirement that juries be instructed
to apply the

standards of a statewide community.

"We agree with the Supreme Court
of Georgia's implicit ruling that
the constitution does not require
that juries be instructed in state
obscenity cases to apply the
standards of a hypothetical statewide community. Miller approved
the use of such instructions; it
did not mandate their use. What
Miller makes clear is that state
juries need not be instructed to
a
PPly national standards. We also
agree with the Supreme Court of
Georgia's implicit approval of the
trial court's instructions directing
jurors to apply 'community standards'
without specifying what 'community1.
Miller held that it was constitutionally
permissible to permit juries to rely
on the understanding of the community
from which they came as to contemporary
community standards, and the States
have considerable latitude in framing
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statutes under this element of
the Miller decision. A state may
choose to define an obscenity offense
in terms of 'contemporary community
standards' as defined in Miller without further specification as was done
heref or it may choose to define the
standards in more precise geographic
terms, as was done by California in
Miller." Id., at 157.
See also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 41
L.Ed.2d 590, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (1974).
The language in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(12)
does not require a state-wide standard nor does it
even suggest that that would be a preferable standard,
and in light of the recent United States Supreme
Court opinions supra, to the contrary, to expect this
court to read into our statute a statewide community
standard would constitute impermissible legislating on
the part of the court.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
ON HOW TO DETERMINE AN "AVERAGE PERSON" IN THE COMMUNITY.
There are two crimes regarding pornography
in Utah, one general and one for minors.

Appellants

claim that there is a separate standard for children
and therefore the trial court erroneously included the
word "children" in instruction No. 15, his explanation
at how the jury should determine what is an "average
person".

Respondent contends that the trial court

used the term "children" only to suggest a formula
-17-

from which the jury could ascertain whether or not
the material was pornographic.

Instruction No. 15

states:
"The test is not whether it would
arouse sexual desires or sexual impure
thoughts in those comprising a particular
segment of the community, the young,
the immature or the highly prudish or
would leave another segment, the
scientific or highly educated or
the so-called wordly-wise and sophisticated indifferent and unmoved.
The test in each case is the
effect of the book, picture or publication considered as a whole, not
upon any particular class, but upon
all those whom it is likely to reach.
In other words, you determine its
impact upon the average person in
the community. The books, pictures
and circulars must be judged as a
whole, in their entire context, and
you are not to consider detached or
separate portions in reaching a conclusion.
You judge the circulars,
pictures and publications which have
been put in evidence by presentday standards of the community. You
may ask yourselves does it offend the
common conscience of the community
by present-day standards.
In this case, members of the jury,
you and you alone are the exclusive
judges of what the common conscience
of the community is, and in determining that conscience you are to
consider the community as a whole,
young and old, educated and uneducated,
the religious and the irreligious —
men, women and children." (Record
Vol. 1-45) (Emphasis added).
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In computing the "average person" the young and old,
the educated and uneducated, the religious and
irreligious, must all be taken into consideration.
The "average person" conception is statutorily
derived.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1203(1)(a) says

that if "the average person" would find the material
pornographic, then it comes under the statute.
There is nothing in the statutes to indicate children
should not be included in that formula, and in fact
§ 76-10-1203(2) language can be read to include
children in all cases:
"In any prosecution dealing with
an offense relating to pornographic
material or performances, or dealing
in harmful material, the question
whether material or a performance appeals
to prurient interest in sex shall be
determined with reference to average
adults or average minors as the case
may be.~" (Emphasis added)
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(12) states:
"•Contemporary community standards1
means those current standards in the
vicinage where an offense alleged
under this act has occurred, is
occurring, or will occur. (Emphasis
added).
The trial court instructed the jury accordingly in
Instruction No. 14 (Record Vol. 1-44)\
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"Contemporary community standards
means those current standards in the
vicinage where an offense alleged
under this action has occurred."
(Emphasis added).
A fair reading of "vicinage" v/ould include the standards
of all persons in the community, not just adults.
The trial judge by including children in
his instruction was merely trying to instruct as
to the conscience of the average person and he was
within permissible statutory grounds to do so.

He

committed no error in his instructions and the
appellants' convictions should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that appellants1
convictions and judgments rendered in the trial court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondents
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Contemporary community standards means those
current standards in the vicinage where an offense alleged
under this action has occurred.
Nudity means the showing of the human male or
female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, with less than
an opaque covering, or the showing of a female breast
with less than an opaque covering, or any portion thereof
below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of
covered male genitals in a discernably turgid state.
Sexual conduct means acts of masturbation,
sexual intercourse, or any touching of a person's
clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks,
or, if the person is a female, breast, whether alone or
between members of the same or opposite sex or between
humans and animals in an act of apparent or actual
sexual stimulation or gratification.
Sexual excitement means a condition of human
male or female genitals when in a state of sexual
stimulation or arousal, or the sensual experiences of
humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or
nudity.
Sado-masochistic abuse means flagellation or
torture by or upon a person who is nude or clad in
undergarments, a mask, or in a revealing or bizarre
costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or
otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so
clothed.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Before you can find the defendant International
Amusements, dba, Adult Book and Cinema Store guilty of a
crime as charged, you must find that the conduct of any
defendant which constitutes the offense with which they
have been charged was authorized, solicited, requested,
commanded, undertaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated
by the Board of Directors or by a high managerial agent
acting within the; scope of his employment and in behalf
of the corporation or association.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

If you find that the defendants or any of them
distributed pornographic material to a person haying
scientific, educational, governmental or other similar
justification for possessing pornographic material,
you must find the defendants or defendant, as the case
may be, not guilty.

